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ABSTRACT
In Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, the
Fourth Circuit held that a foreign company with no U.S.
federal trademark registration for "FLANAX" could
nevertheless demand cancellation of its competitor's U.S.
trademark for "FLANAX". This holding circumvented
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, a provision which
protects trademark owners in signatory countries by way of
the well-known mark doctrine. Following Belmora's
precedent would allow foreign trademark owners to bypass
the U.S.'s existing trademark registration system and so
undermine U.S. trademark law's central principle of
territoriality. This Article argues that Article 6bis is critical
to asserting substantive rights on behalf of foreign
trademark owners in the U.S. Part I of this Article reviews
the history and common criticisms behind the well-known
mark doctrine. Part II balances the doctrine against
trademark territoriality and applies its resulting theory to
the Belmora decision. Part III reviews theories for reform
and argues that where unfair competition law conflicts with
a foundational trademark principle such as territoriality,
trademark principles should triumph.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff may have
standing under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act even if it had not used its
trademark in commerce within the United States.1 Belmora LLC v.
Bayer Consumer Care AG thus opened an opportunity for foreign
trademark owners to bypass the U.S.'s existing trademark system
and its current registrants. Such decisions are not unprecedented.2
However, Belmora did something unique: the court's reasoning
circumvented Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, a provision
which protects trademark owners in signatory countries. By creating
case law for the 'famous' or 'well-known mark' doctrine that does not
attach to Article 6bis, the decision came into tension with the
territoriality principle at the heart of U.S. trademark law.
I. THE WELL-KNOWN MARK DOCTRINE
Under Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, a foreign
trademark's owner can petition the trademark offices in countries
which have signed the treaty to refuse or to cancel the registration,
and to prohibit the use of virtually any trademark which could be
confused with the foreign trademark owner's well-known mark
where that mark is being used for the sale of identical or similar
goods.3 This is known colloquially as the 'famous' or 'well-known
mark' doctrine.4 The U.S. signed onto the treaty in 1887 and has
been a significant party to its revisions in subsequent years.5 In
theory, Article 6bis thus grants exclusive protection within the U.S.
to any trademark owned by a foreign national. This protection
1

Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697, 701 (4th Cir. 2016).
See infra Part I.B.
3
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Art. 6bis, July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter "Paris Convention"].
4
Courts and commentators have used the terms interchangeably; however,
because the well-known mark doctrine differs from the 'famous mark’
necessary to prove cause for trademark dilution in the U.S., this Article
confines its discussion to the term 'well-known mark’.
5
See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The Trips Agreement and
New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 19 (2004).
2
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applies even if the owner has not registered that mark with the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office or used it in the U.S., so long as its
home country is a signatory to the Paris Convention.6
A. History
1. Considerations During and After the Paris Convention
Created in 1883, the Paris Convention aimed to create a baseline
for international dealings in trademark and unfair competition.7
Drafters at the convention focused on ensuring reciprocal treatment
with regard to intellectual property rights for intellectual property
owners in signatory countries, regardless of whether those owners
had sought formal rights outside of their home countries.8 This
priority grew into Article 6bis, which elides the user requirement
within a given country for well-known marks and emphasizes
instead factors such as source indication, the basis of the defendant's
use, and the defendant's co-opting of goodwill.9 Although the U.S.
has been a longstanding signatory, the extent to which the Paris
Convention has had any substantive effect on U.S. trademark law is
still an open question.10

6

Certain reviewers have argued that Article 10bis of the Paris Convention—
which prohibits any act which serves to create trademark confusion, or
otherwise mislead consumers regarding identical or similar goods—
deliberately reinforces Article 6bis’s effect. Treating unfair competition
claims and trademark infringement claims as interchangeable, however, has
confused the law over time. In an effort to distinguish the topic, examining the
interoperability of Article 10bis within the well-known marks doctrine falls
outside the scope of this Article. For discussion on the blur between unfair
competition and trademark infringement, see infra Part II.C.
7
3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 19:74 (4th ed. 2005).
8
Geri L. Haight & Philip Catanzano, The Effects of Global Priority of
Trademark Rights, 91 MASS. L. REV. 18, 21 (2007).
9
Paris Convention, supra note 2.
10
See 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 29:4, at 29–30 (4th ed. 2005) (claiming that Article 6bis has
been incorporated into U.S. trademark canon via §§ 43(a), 43(b), and 44(h) of
the Lanham Act); see also infra Part I.C.2.
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The question endures in large part because of the Paris
Convention's unclear status in the U.S. Since the Paris Convention
is not a self-executing treaty, trademark owners can claim rights
under the treaty only to the extent that its signatory countries
espouse those rights in substantive legislation.11 Like many
countries, however, U.S. trademark law has historically emphasized
territoriality in both its common law decisions and in its statutes.12
This principle holds that intellectual property rights are inherently
national in character and any protections granted on the basis of such
rights have limited extraterritorial reach.13 Faithful to the
territoriality principle, courts have rarely extended U.S. trademark
laws into foreign countries.14 Due to this lingering tension, the Paris
Convention has had scattered and sporadic influence in the U.S.15
2. The TRIPS Agreement and Influences on the Doctrine's
Development
Concerned that the Paris Convention provided insufficient
protections for intellectual property owners, the U.S. negotiated and
lobbied for the inclusion of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights into the Uruguay Round of
11

See 7 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 24:1 (reviewing the origins and limitations
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, including the Paris
Convention).
12
See, e.g.,15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2000).
13
See, e.g., Pers.'s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568–69 (Fed. Cir.
1990) ("The concept of territoriality is basic to trademark law; trademark
rights exist in each country solely according to that country's statutory
scheme.").
14
See Circuit Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (holding that
Lanham Act claims extend into foreign countries only when the alleged
infringer's conduct affects U.S. commerce and applicable foreign law does not
explicitly preclude the application of U.S. law). Subsequent cases include
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 743–44, 747 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that not every activity of a foreign corporation with any tendency to
create some confusion among American consumers could be prohibited by the
extraterritorial reach of a U.S. injunction); First Niagara Ins. Brokers, Inc. v.
First Niagara Fin. Group, Inc., 476 F.3d 867 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Hilton Intern.
Co., Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 888 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
15
See infra Part II.B.1.
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1994.16 The TRIPS
Agreement supplemented the protections granted to foreign
trademarks in signatory countries under the Paris Convention by
protecting service marks.17 It also extended a well-known trademark
owner's rights to preventing uses of identical or similar trademarks
for dissimilar goods or services, "provided that use of that trademark
in relation to those goods or services would indicate a connection
between those goods or services and the owner of the registered
trademark and provided that the interest of the owner of the
registered trademark are likely to be damaged by such use."18
Seeking to address concerns on varying applications of the terms
'reputation' and 'well-known' for well-known trademarks in
signatory countries, the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") bolstered the agreement in 1998 by way of a 'Joint
Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of WellKnown Marks'.19 This served as an advisory document for countries
seeking guidelines on implementing the well-known marks
doctrine.
In application, however, the TRIPS Agreement has also had a
limited impact on U.S. trademark canon. Language within the
agreement itself indicates that members must "give effect to the
provisions of this Agreement" for the treaty to hold sway, and are
"free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and
practice."20 Federal law further provides that U.S. statutes must
triumph where any such laws prove inconsistent with the TRIPS
16

JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION
175–6 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
17
TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197, Art. 16(2)
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS or TRIPS Agreement] ("Article 6bis of
the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to services.").
18
TRIPS, Art. 16(3).
19
World Intellectual Property Organization, Joint Recommendation
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well–Known Marks (Sept.
1999), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/marks/833/pub833.pdf/.
20
TRIPS, Art. 1(1).

2017]

TAKING CARE OF ARTICLE 6BISNESS

507

agreement.21 Thus, courts have uniformly held that the agreement is
not, in itself, a self-executing treaty with the force of law.22
B. Current Doctrinal Application in the U.S.
As a result, the U.S.'s application of the well-known marks
doctrine has proven unwieldy and controversial. Courts generally
agree on the doctrine's definition—namely that owners of wellknown trademarks in foreign countries may theoretically prohibit
the use of identical or similar-looking marks in the U.S. by way of
a trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act, even where
the foreign mark's owner has not registered the mark or used the
mark in U.S. commerce.23 However, the bases by which a foreign
trademark owner may claim such rights vary wildly between
jurisdictions.24 Before Belmora, two perspectives reigned.25 The
first view held that Article 6bis of the Paris Convention had been
effectively integrated into existing trademark legislation through §
44(b) of the Lanham Act, which provides that a foreign national
whose country of origin is a party "to any convention relating to
trademarks… or the repression of unfair competition, to which the
United States is also a party"26 is entitled to all benefits arising from

21

19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) ("No provision of any of the Uruguay Round
Agreements [including the TRIPS Agreement], nor the application of any such
provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of
the United States shall have effect.").
22
See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 161 (2d Cir. 2007)
("TRIPS is plainly not a self-executing treaty. . . ."); In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207,
1209 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (". . . we find that the Paris Convention is not a selfexecuting treaty.").
23
See generally American Circuit Breaker Corp. v. Oregon Breakers, Inc.,
406 F.3d 577, 581–83 (9th Cir. 2005); Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369
F.3d 700, 714 (3d Cir. 2004); Buti v. Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir.
1998).
24
See, e.g., Grupo Gigante II, 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir.
2004); Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324,
326–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
25
See Anne Gilson LaLonde, Don't I Know You from Somewhere? Protection
in the United States of Foreign Trademarks That Are Well Known but Not
Used There, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1379, 1396 (2008).
26
15 U.S.C § 1126.
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the Lanham Act.27 The second view held that, because no U.S.
federal trademark legislation existed to codify the Paris Convention
or the TRIPS Agreement, neither agreement had been formally
executed and could not be construed as law.28 Over time, these views
consolidated into the primary rallying points for proponents and
opponents of the argument that the well-known mark doctrine was
an exception to the territoriality principle underlying U.S. trademark
law.
1. Ninth Circuit Requirements
In Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co.,29 the Ninth
Circuit explicitly exempted the well-known marks doctrine from the
territoriality principle underlying U.S. trademark law. In 2004, a
Mexican grocery chain sued a grocery store in California, claiming
trademark infringement of its trademark 'Gigante'. While it had not
registered the 'Gigante' mark in the U.S., the plaintiff argued that its
mark was well-known and so entitled to protection under the
Lanham Act by way of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention.30 The
Grupo court held that Article 6bis provided a substantive right for
foreign trademark owners enforceable through § 44 of the Lanham
Act.31 Affirming the district court in its exemption, the Ninth Circuit
justified the doctrine as merely "recognizing the realities of modern
society and business by acknowledging the fact that a trademark can
be carried to areas far from the actual point of sale due to advertising
and the ambulatory nature of consumers."32
Recognizing the doctrine's potential conflicts with territoriality,
however, the Grupo court imposed specific limits on well-known
trademark claims. In particular, the Ninth Circuit determined that
significant factors included
[whether] a substantial percentage of consumers in
the relevant American market is familiar with the
27
28
29
30
31
32

See infra Part I.B.1.
See infra Part I.B.2.
Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1098.
Id.
Id. at 1090.
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foreign mark[,] . . . the geographic area where the
defendant uses the alleged infringing mark[,] . . . the
intentional copying of the mark by the defendant, and
whether customers of the American firm are likely to
think they are patronizing the same firm that uses the
mark in another country.33
Finding such factors need not be considered dispositive, the court
held. Rather, the relevant inquiry should be directed towards factors
which "bear heavily on the risks of consumer confusion and fraud,"
and which must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.34
Commentators have noted the decision's lack of precedent and
the test's openness to judicial manipulation.35 By failing to establish
grounds in which to root Grupo's precedent, and by refusing to
establish concrete standards by which to define a well-known mark,
critics have argued that the well-known mark doctrine provides an
opening to weaken the territoriality principle significantly.
2. Rejection of the Doctrine in the Second Circuit
Not three years after Grupo, the opposite pole to the well-known
marks doctrine grew from the Second Circuit. In ITC Ltd. v.
Punchgini, Inc.,36 the court determined that no legislative basis
existed to insert the well-known marks doctrine into the Lanham
Act. In ITC Ltd., restaurant owners operating in Southeastern Asia
under the trademark BUKHARA sued former employees who had
opened two restaurants in New York City under the trademark
BUKHARA GRILL. Arguing that the defendants had deliberately
mimicked the plaintiffs' allegedly internationally renowned
33

Id. at 1098.
Id.
35
See generally Kristin Zobel, The Famous Marks Doctrine: Can and Should
Well-Known Foreign Marks Receive Trademark Protection Within the United
States?, 19 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 145 (2008); James
Faris, The Famous Marks Exception to the Territoriality Principle in
American Trademark Law, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 451 (2009); Rachel
Brook, The United States' Adoption of the Well-Known Foreign Mark
Exception, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 889 (2009).
36
ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007).
34
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marks37—which included logos, decor, staff uniforms, wood-slab
menus, and red-checkered customer bibs38—the plaintiffs sued for
trademark infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising in
violation of the Lanham Act.39
The Second Circuit, however, held that it could not discern in
the relevant portions of the Lanham Act "a clear congressional intent
to incorporate a famous marks exception into federal unfair
competition law."40 To carve out an exception for marks of
international renown in U.S. law was Congressional territory.
Arguments based on policy, the court asserted, "must be submitted
to Congress for it to determine whether and under what
circumstances to accord federal recognition to such an exception to
the basic principle of territoriality."41 But the foreign plaintiffs were
not left entirely without recourse: in a later opinion, the court held
that the plaintiffs were eligible to file a misappropriation claim
under New York state law, provided that they could prove secondary
meaning.42 Ultimately, the Second Circuit demurred from
incorporating the Paris Convention into existing federal trademark
canon.
In the seven years following, the ITC and Grupo decisions
effectively dichotomized the tensions underlying the U.S. approach
to the well-known mark doctrine: courts could either seek to
incorporate Article 6bis into trademark canon or stand by the Paris
Convention's non-self-executing nature.43
C. Contemporary Criticisms
Due in large part to the doctrine's bipolarity, items key to the
well-known marks doctrine have often been left to judicial
37

Id. at 143.
Id. at 144.
39
Id. at 142.
40
Id. at 163.
41
Id. at 165.
42
ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 518 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2007).
43
See, e.g., Paleteria La Michoacana, Inc. v. Productos Lacteos Tocumbo
S.A. De C.V., 69 F. Supp. 3d 175 (D.D.C. 2014); Kerzner Int'l Ltd. v. Monarch
Casino & Resort, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D. Nev. 2009); Aktieselskabet
AF 21. Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007
[hereinafter Well-Known Mark Doctrine Cases]).
38
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discretion. Courts have ranged in their definitions of terms, from
what may constitute a "well-known mark" to the factors necessary
for a finding of trademark infringement, much to the doctrine's
detriment.
1. Judicial Vagueness in Defining and Evaluating a "Well-Known"
Mark
In the decades since the well-known marks doctrine reached the
U.S., standards for key terms such as 'well-known' have remained
unclear.44 This confusion originated in part from a failure to
uniformly confirm or condemn the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris
Convention as treaties which have, or lack, the force of law in the
U.S.45 The Paris Convention provided few requirements, holding
only that Article 6bis was expected
to prohibit the use of a trademark which constitutes a
reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to
create confusion, of a mark considered by the
competent authority of the country of registration or
use to be well known in that country as being already
the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this
Convention and used for identical or similar goods.46
As a result, circuits vary not only in their definitions of the term, but
in whether judges even reference the factors provided by way of
WIPO's joint recommendations.47
Part of this confusion also appears etymological. Though the two
doctrines apply to distinct forms of trademark harm, courts have not
yet settled on how much, if at all, the 'well-known mark' overlaps
with the 'famous mark' whose owner may sue for trademark dilution.
Grupo imposes only two requirements, both of which suggest a use
requirement typical for a trademark infringement claim.48 Compare
44

MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS

45

Id.
Paris Convention, Art. 6bis.
See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 518 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2007).
Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir.

See generally 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:4 (4th ed.).

46
47
48
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these requirements with earlier cases, which were often brought
under a cloud of unfair competition claims. In Maison Prunier v.
Prunier's Restaurant & Café,49 the court held that protections for the
senior user's mark reached the territory where it had established a
reputation, regardless of whether it had actually used or failed to use
the mark in that territory. The court focused primarily on the
American defendant's bad faith intent to take advantage of the senior
user's reputation in France.50 The mere assertion that the plaintiff
had "a well-known reputation and good will built up as the result of
decades of honest business effort" was sufficient to entitle it to
consideration as a well-known mark owner.51 Instead, the court's
focus steered towards the broader precepts of unfair competition.52
This contrasts, not only the non-exhaustive list of factors presented
in Grupo, but also the many well-known mark factors that WIPO
has put forward for consideration.53
Subsequent courts have prioritized public policy over
established factors in evaluating the well-known marks doctrine,
depending on whether the substance of the claims seems to emerge
from unfair competition or trademark infringement law.54
Problematically, courts do not always distinguish between wellknown mark precedents drawn from unfair competition claims and
those drawn from trademark infringement. Courts have thus varied
in their willingness to prioritize specific factors in finding a wellknown mark, let alone whether the doctrine has any bearing in their
circuit, based on a jumble of considerations between bodies of law.55
2004).
Maison Prunier v. Prunier's Restaurant & Café, 288 N.Y.S. 529 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1936).
50
Id. at 537.
51
Id. at 531.
52
Id. at 532.
53
World Intellectual Property Organization, Joint Recommendation
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well–Known Marks (Sept. 1999),
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/marks/833/pub833.pdf/.
54
See Well-Known Mark Doctrine Cases, supra note 43; for general
discussion of the interplay between the Paris Convention and unfair
competition law, see Patricia V. Norton, The Effect of Article 10bis of the Paris
Convention on American Unfair Competition Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 225
(1999).
55
See Well-Known Mark Doctrine Cases, supra note 43.
49
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The uncertainty of the doctrine's definition has thus crippled its
growth and applicability.
2. Lack of Use Requirement
In a striking departure from general trademark tenets, U.S.
courts have failed to require any showing of use from the wellknown mark doctrine.56 Subsequent courts have typically looked to
Grupo as the primary implementation of the well-known mark
doctrine in the U.S.57 Grupo, however, set out only two
requirements: (1) that a preponderance of the evidence must show
that a substantial percentage of relevant American consumers were
aware of the mark, and (2) that these consumers must be in the
disputed area.58 Thus, Grupo's language elides the presumed notice
critical to establishing the rights of unregistered marks.
Efforts to bridge the discrepancy between the well-known mark
doctrine and standard U.S. trademark canon have varied. Some
academics have read the doctrine to expand on trademark dilution
and to evaluate the suit based on whether the defendant's use of the
mark impacts the reputation of the plaintiff's goods or services.59
Under the Dilution Act, the plaintiff need not prove a likelihood of
confusion or that the defendant sought to compete with the plaintiff's
goods or services.60 Instead, the plaintiff must only demonstrate that
the defendant's use of a mark weakened the connection between the
plaintiff's mark and the plaintiff's goods or services in the relevant

56

See Anne Gilson LaLonde, Don't I Know You from Somewhere? Protection
in the United States of Foreign Trademarks That Are Well Known but Not
Used There, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1379 (2008).
57
See Well-Known Mark Doctrine supra note 43.
58
Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir.
2004).
59
Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The Other Famous Marks Doctrine, 17 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 757 (2008)).
60
See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 25 cmt. b. (1995) ("[T]he
state of mind required for confusion and dilution are distinct and inconsistent.
Confused consumers believe that the actor's use of the mark indicates a
connection with the trademark owner, and thus for those consumers the actor's
use does not dilute the distinctiveness of the mark.").
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geographic market,61 or that the defendant's use of the mark causes
an unsavory or inferior reflection upon the plaintiff's products.62
Such a reading, however, strays from the doctrine's intended effects
under Article 6bis. A dilution suit in the U.S. requires that the mark
at issue must be "widely recognized by the general consuming
public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods
or services of the mark's owner."63 Notably, recognition seems
unlikely within the U.S. without either use or actual registration.64
3. New Zone-of-Interests Requirement
Over time, even standing has become an issue in applying the
doctrine. In 2014, the Supreme Court adopted a 'zone-of-interests'
test in determining who may bring a claim for false advertising.65
Distilled, Lexmark v. Static Control Components, Inc. requires that
courts evaluate whether a claimant falls within the zone-ofinterests—better known as the class of plaintiffs authorized to sue
under § 1125(a)—based on two considerations: (i) whether the
plaintiff is seeking to protect interests that the statute was designed
to redress, and (ii) whether a plaintiff can successfully plead, and
subsequently prove, an injury to a commercial interest in sales or
business reputation proximately caused by the defendant's
misrepresentations.66 The Lexmark court intended these as factors
for determining 'statutory' standing rather than 'prudential'
standing,67 and the test was meant to be "not especially
demanding."68 Lexmark thus departed significantly from previous
standing rules for false advertising claims, which had developed a

61

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
63
Anne Gilson LaLonde, Don't I Know You from Somewhere? Protection in
the United States of Foreign Trademarks That Are Well Known but Not Used
There, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1379, 1396 (2008).
64
Id.
65
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377
(2014).
66
Id. at 1391–2.
67
Id. at 1386.
68
Id. at 1389.
62
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reputation for stringency.69
However, by expanding standing for trademark infringement
suits to incorporate protection from unfair competition, specifically
"injuries to business reputation and present and future sales," the
Lexmark Court created a target all too easy for foreign marks to
reach.70 Under American trademark canon, almost any case where a
defendant's foreign conduct confuses American consumers will
likely have a substantial effect on U.S. commerce.71 Indeed, courts
have traditionally weighed American consumer confusion more
significantly than other factors in findings of foreign trademark
infringement.72 Although relaxing the standard for false advertising
claims expands the class of permissible plaintiffs, Lexmark acted too
generously in granting standing to a doctrine which has yet to
establish the boundaries of its key terms and requirements.
Traditional statutory standing under the Lanham Act has been
expected to further the Act's specific purpose: preventing consumer
confusion and preserving producer goodwill.73 While Lexmark
benefited consumers by shifting the focus onto the harm suffered by
plaintiffs, the decision offers no barrier to foreign trademark owners
seeking to take advantage of the well-known trademark doctrine.

69

Deborah R. Gerhardt, Lexmark and the Death of Initial Interest Confusion,
7 LANDSLIDE 22, 25 (2014) ("Standing rules for false advertising claims had
been viewed as notoriously stringent.").
70
Id. (discussing the Lexmark court’s recognition of the false advertising
statute’s purpose as protection from unfair competition and lack of basis for
applying the test any differently to trademark infringement litigation).
71
See, e.g., United Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); see also
Fun–Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 1006 (2d Cir.
1997) (importing infringing products "clearly has substantial impact on United
States commerce").
72
See, e.g., Rodgers v. Wright, 544 F. Supp. 2d 302, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(holding that the Lanham Act applies to an American defendant's foreign
infringement where that infringement resulted in a likelihood of a confusion
to American consumers); see also Piccoli A/S v. Calvin Klein Jeanswear Co.,
19 F. Supp. 2d 157, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (emphasizing a substantial effect
on U.S. commerce where a defendant's conduct results in consumer
confusion).
73
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2:1 (4th ed.).
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D. A comparison in doctrinal expectations
The U.S.'s failure to sustain a coherent body of case law for the
well-known mark is not unique;74 nevertheless, it provides a striking
contrast to the doctrine's development elsewhere. Through the
European Court of Justice ("ECJ"), Paris Convention signatories in
Europe have established both the grounds by which a claimant may
raise the doctrine as well as the factors which define a 'well-known
mark'.75 While the well-known mark doctrine in Europe took root
for different reasons than it did in the U.S., 76 the two nevertheless
yield instructive parallels. Citizens of Europe, for example, are more
likely to travel from country to country than their American
counterparts.77 Packaging of a single product often varies
significantly from country to country, even those which border one
another.78 As such, consumers accustomed to receiving products
from a variety of countries must rely less on the packaging of a given
product and more on the source-identifying function of a trademark.
Filing for a trademark in every country of the European Union,
however, is far more expensive than filing for a federal trademark
to cover a similar expanse of territory in the U.S.79 The well-known
mark doctrine thus enables European companies to exclude others
from using their marks for a given good or service where such
companies can prove that the mark has a strong likelihood of
74

See Stephanie M. Greene, Protecting Well-Known Marks in China:
Challenges for Foreign Mark Holders, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 371 (2008).
75
See infra Part I.D.1.
76
See infra Part III.A.1.
77
HostelWorld, Introducing the Hostelworld Meet The World Report… (last
visited
May
23,
2017),
available
at
http://www.hostelworld.com/blog/introducing-hostelworld-meet-worldreport/.
78
Mary LaFrance, A Material World: Using Trademark Law to Override
Copyright's First Sale Rule for Imported Copies, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 43, 72–3 (2014) ("Goods manufactured or packaged
specifically for foreign markets might have different ingredients, might be
labeled or packaged differently, might be accompanied by different
documentation (perhaps in a language other than English), might have been
subjected to different levels of quality control during manufacturing,
packaging, handling, or shipping, and might be covered by different
warranties.").
79
See 1 TRADEMARKS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD § 54:2.
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confusing consumers in a specific geographic region, even without
registration. Such a right recalls the common law use doctrine in the
U.S. However, the E.U. showcases a tendency to mix unfair
competition precedents into trademark-based claims, based on
specific directives and tenets unfeasible under U.S. trademark
canon.
1. Defining Case Law in the E.U.
Cases such as General Motors Corp v. Yplon SA established the
boundaries and factors to consider in evaluating a trademark's
reputation, particularly the market share held by the earlier mark. In
General Motors Corp. v. Yplon SA, both General Motors and Yplon
had registered the word mark CHEVY at the Benelux Trademark
Office: General Motors for motor vehicles in 1971 and Yplon for
cleaning products. General Motors sought an injunction
against Yplon's use of the mark under the Trademark Directive,
which protected well-known trademarks from dilution.80 In
determining General Motors' rights, the European Court of Justice
specifically addressed two questions: "1) How is the concept of a
trademark with a reputation within the meaning of Article 5(2) of
the Directive to be interpreted?; 2) Must the reputation of the
trademark extend throughout the three Benelux countries or is it
sufficient that its reputation is established in one of those countries
or part thereof?"81 The court subsequently compared the defining
characteristics of a mark with a reputation to those of a well-known
trademark, and ultimately held that "a mark with a reputation need
not be as well-known as a well-known mark."82 Instead, the ECJ
held that a mark with a reputation must satisfy two conditions: "it
must be known to a large part of the public concerned by the two
products in question … [and] the earlier mark must have a reputation
such that the consumer, on seeing the contested mark, associates the
latter with the earlier mark and makes a connection between the

80

Case C-375/97, General Motors Corp. v. Yplon, S.A., [1999] E.C.R. I5421, [1999] E.T.M.R. 122.
81
Id. at ¶ 17.
82
Id. at ¶ 37.
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two."83
Significantly, the ECJ's ruling refers back to Article 5 of the
Trademark Directive, which allows suit based on use of a trademark
which "takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive
character or the repute of the trade mark."84 Later courts have only
expanded upon this right, holding that member states may allow
trademark owners to prevent third parties from using the sign for
dissimilar goods, even though no likelihood of confusion exists.85
As such, the Directive currently provides for three different levels
of protection in member states: (1) protections afforded to trademark
owners for marks related to goods or services which are identical to
those for which the mark is registered; (2) protections for trademark
users against marks which are identical or similar to registered
marks and likely to cause confusion on the part of the public; and
(3) protections for trademark users against marks identical or similar
to well-known marks, registered or otherwise.
The E.U.'s blend of unfair competition and trademark law,
however, has taken trademark law's ability to police unfair
competition to an extreme. In L'Oréal v. Bellure,86 L'Oréal took
legal action for trademark infringement against Bellure after Bellure
manufactured and marketed a line of 'smell-alike' perfumes modeled
on the more famous L'Oréal products with explicit, continuous
comparisons to the L'Oréal brand perfumes. Although Bellure never
sought to pass off its products as those of L'Oréal, L'Oréal
nevertheless filed suit with both trademark infringement and unfair
competition claims, arguing that that Bellure had infringed their
registered word-marks and that Bellure had used their marks to
attain an unfair advantage in the market.87 Upon referral to the ECJ,
the court held that the Trademark Directive did not require
likelihood of confusion or detriment to the trademark owner's
83

Id. at ¶ 38.
Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon AG v. Fitnessworld Training LTD, 2003
E.C.R. 0000, 2003 WL 101343.
85
See, e.g., Case C-418/02, Praktiker Bau v. Heimwerkermarkte AG, 2005
E.C.R. I-05873; Case C-421/04, Matratzen Concord AG v. Hukla Germany
SA, 2006 E.C.R. 1-02303; Mastercard International Incorporated v. Hitachi
Credit (Uk) Plc ChD (Bailii, [2004] EWHC 1623 (Ch)).
86
Case C-487/07, L'Oréal v. Bellure, 2009 E.C.R. I-05185.
87
Id. ¶ 12.
84
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business. Rather, the 'unfair advantage' derives from the third-party
user's "riding on the coat-tails" of the senior mark in order to benefit
from the senior mark's reputation and existing goodwill "without
paying any financial compensation."88 Provided that use of the
junior mark either affected, or was liable to affect, one of the other
major functions of the senior mark, a court could find an unfair
advantage and could subsequently bar use of the junior mark.
The decision troubled U.S. commentators in large part because
the case turned on "vague and undefined notions of unfair
competition and free riding."89 Where U.S. law focuses on the harm
suffered by the senior mark user,90 the concept of "taking unfair
advantage"91 shifts the court's attention instead to the benefits
received by the junior mark user. This hostility to free-riding, critics
have argued, goes against the economic purpose of U.S. trademark
law: its vagueness significantly impairs comparative advertising and
chills the possibility of smaller competitors entering a market
already dominated by a trademark user with an established
reputation.92
Taken together, General Motors and its successors provide three
vital distinctions between E.U. trademark law and U.S. canon. First,
the Trademark Directive codifies references to unfair competition
claims, which enables trademark owners to bring dilution suits
based on misappropriation of goodwill.93 Second, the Directive does
not require likelihood of confusion requirement from suits brought
on behalf of a well-known mark. In such cases, the question
becomes whether the relevant section of the public has heard of the
mark rather than whether the junior mark would confuse them.
Third, the qualifications to become a well-known mark in the E.U.
88

Id. ¶ 49.
See, e.g., J. Thomas McCarthy, Dilution of a Trademark: European and
United States Law, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1163, 1165 (2004).
90
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
91
L’Oréal, ¶¶ 41, 49.
92
See generally Tim W. Dornis & Thomas Wein, Trademarks, Comparative
Advertising, and Product Imitations: An Untold Story of Law and Economics,
121 PENN ST. L. REV. 421 (2016).
93
See Marcus H. H. Luepke, Taking Unfair Advantage or Diluting A
Famous Mark - A 20/20 Perspective on the Blurred Differences Between
U.S. and E.U. Dilution Law, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 789 (2008).
89
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are not nearly as stringent as those of the U.S. The Lanham Act
mandates that only nationally famous marks can raise anti-dilution
claims—specifically, those marks that are "widely recognized by the
general consuming public of the United States as a designation of
source of the goods or services of the mark's owner."94 By contrast,
marks seeking protection under the E.U.'s anti-dilution laws may
still receive all the benefits of a famous mark, provided that it carries
some reputation in a substantial portion of the relevant market
sector. This, however, may have a significant chilling effect on its
competition, at odds with the U.S. pro-competition spirit.
II.

BELMORA LLC V. BAYER CONSUMER CARE AG

In Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, the Fourth Circuit
held that a foreign company, which had neither used nor registered
"FLANAX" in the U.S., could nevertheless demand cancellation of
its competitor's "FLANAX" U.S. trademark registration. In
Belmora, the plaintiff sold pain relievers under the "FLANAX"
mark in Mexico and other parts of Latin America since the 1970s,
but never in the U.S.95 In 2004, the defendant, which owned the
FLANAX trademark in the U.S., used it to sell its own pain
relievers. The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against the defendant,
contending that Belmora had deliberately "used the FLANAX mark
to… deceive Mexican–American consumers into thinking they were
purchasing [the plaintiff's] product,"96 and alleged that the plaintiff
had been injured by this "false association with its FLANAX
product in violation of Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(A)."97
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that foreign marks which had
been neither registered nor used in U.S. commerce could
nevertheless find protection under the Lanham Act. Because the
plaintiff had abandoned its Article 6bis claims on appeal, the court
fell back instead to the premise that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act had
become a shelter for unfair competition as well as trademark
94

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012).
Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697, 701 (4th Cir.
2016).
96
Id. at 701–2.
97
Id.
95
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infringement claims.98 As a result, the court's reasoning necessarily
deviated from precedent raised in either the Second or the Ninth
Circuits. Specifically, the court emphasized that "this is an unfair
competition case, not a trademark infringement case."99 Holding
that Congress had deliberately omitted any requirement that a
plaintiff use its own mark in U.S. commerce in order to have
standing to sue under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act,100 the Belmora
court determined that the plaintiff's case could be read as a series of
unfair competition claims, and could accordingly be judged only on
the merits of those claims. Most significant among the Belmora
Court's rulings are its determinations that use in U.S. commerce had
never been an express prerequisite to bringing a § 43(a) action,101
and that the well-known mark doctrine entrenches the very core of
American trademark law: preventing consumer confusion and
preserving the goodwill of the manufacturer.102
A. Territoriality in U.S. Trademark Law
Under the territoriality principle, trademark registration
represents the government's recognition of an individual's right to a
specific brand within the country.103 By definition, trademarks act
as source-indicators and as tools to compile goodwill towards the
owner's specific goods or services.104 Thus, a trademark is useful
only so long as the owner can exclude others from use of that mark
for purposes of marketing particular goods or services.105
Exclusivity serves both the mark-owner and the consuming public:
98

Id. at 710.
Id. at 708.
100
Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697, 708 (4th Cir.
2016).
101
Id. at 706.
102
Id. at 714.
103
See Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d
591, 599 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Ingenohl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S.
541, 544 (1927) ("... the territoriality principle is one that is "basic to trademark
law," in which trademark rights "exist in each country solely according to that
country's statutory scheme.")).
104
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2:1 (4th ed.).
105
See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923) (first case in the U.S.
to reject the "universality" theory of trademarks in favor of territoriality).
99
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by registering a trademark, the owner has incentive to perpetuate the
mark's reputation by streamlining product quality. Further, the
public knows to rely on the mark for products of established quality.
Because a national government can only exercise control within its
country borders, academics and courts alike have generally held that
trademarks rely on territoriality as a matter of common sense.
Nevertheless, the territoriality principle serves a narrower
purpose than the unfair competition principles which formed the
trademark system. As a result, parts of trademark law seem to
oppose one another where territoriality conflicts with the larger
precepts of unfair competition law. Comparing the treatment of the
common law trademark doctrine with that of the well-known mark
doctrine makes this particularly clear. Both operate under the
presumption that marks deserve certain rights based on the
likelihood of consumer confusion. Territoriality, however,
emphasizes the geographic scope of use as well as the likelihood of
confusion; thus common law marks have established rights without
registration, while the rights of registered foreign marks are
conditional.
Other jurisdictions have avoided this question entirely by
protecting unregistered marks exclusively under unfair competition
law: the E.U., for example, holds that a passing-off plaintiff must
show misrepresentation, damages, and loss of goodwill in order to
succeed in a passing-off suit.106 By extending protection to
unregistered marks, the government imposes a double-qualification:
trademarks may receive protection based not only on government
acknowledgement, but on any use which may result in consumer
confusion. Thus, while courts have claimed that "foreign use is
ineffectual to create trademark rights in the United States,"107
foreign use is not irreconcilable with ongoing U.S. trademark canon.
Owners of foreign trademarks have largely used two legal theories.
First, they may claim priority rights based on use of the mark in the
U.S. in compliance with the territoriality principle.108 Second, they
106

See Erven Warnink B.V. v. J. Townsend & Sons (Hull) Ltd., [1979] A.C.
731 (H.L.).
107
La Societe Anonyme des Parfums le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d
1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1974).
108
See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007).
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may seek exemption from the territoriality principle and claim a
similar priority right based on likelihood of confusion based on the
broader principles of false advertising and unfair competition law.109
Arguments against exempting foreign use from the territoriality
principle have traditionally been directed towards two items: first, a
refusal to overextend the Lanham Act;110 second, concerns
regarding foreign retribution, which could weaken the trademarks
of American companies abroad.111 Where a U.S. national acts
abroad, for instance, courts have had fewer qualms in extending the
Lanham Act's reach.112
B. How the Territoriality Principle Weakens the Belmora Decision
Faced with judicial vagueness on doctrinal definitions and
requirements, Belmora inevitably drew controversy when it tried to
circumvent the Paris Convention's lingering open question. The
Fourth Circuit essentially rooted its acknowledgement of the wellknown mark doctrine in the premise that § 43(a) has become
understood as a shelter for unfair competition claims as well as
trademark infringement claims.113 As a result, the court dismissed
previous holdings which treated use of the mark at issue within the
U.S. as a prerequisite, determining that this had been imposed as an
extraneous condition upon the statute.114 This reading comports with
unfair competition law. Unlike trademark infringement, unfair
109

See, e.g., De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate,
Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
110
See supra Part I.B.2.
111
See Robert C. Bird & Elizabeth Brown, The Protection of Well-Known
Foreign Marks in the United States: Potential Global Responses to Domestic
Ambivalence, 38 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1 (2012).
112
See United Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (American
company had a right to enjoin Mexican businesses from using its trademark in
Mexico); see also Int'l Café, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Café Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252
F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2001); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d
633 (2d Cir. 1956).
113
Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697, 710 (4th Cir.
2016).
114
Id. at 706 ("… the plain language of § 43(a) does not require that a plaintiff
possess or have used a trademark in U.S. commerce as an element of the cause
of action.").
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competition claims typically need only show that the work at issue
originated with the plaintiff, that the defendant falsely designated
the work's origin, that the false designation was likely to cause
consumer confusion, and that the plaintiff was harmed by the
defendant's false designation.115 In theory, unfair competition
precepts thus demand an exception to the territoriality principle in
U.S. trademark canon for foreign trademark owners.
However, Belmora misses the counterpoint between unfair
competition and trademark infringement claims: namely, while the
two have historically been intertwined, unfair competition has
historically reflected broader priorities. Where its priorities aligned
with those of trademark law, this caused no discrepancy.
Territoriality's nation-specific focus, however, lies directly at odds
with unfair competition's potentially global application, and
subsequently with the well-known marks doctrine.
Wholly avoiding the territoriality principle in the Belmora
tradition is impractical. Territoriality traditionally exists to protect
domestic goodwill. Commentators have made arguments regarding
the impact of reputational feedback, market allocation, and freeriding,116 but these de-emphasize if not disregard consumer
confusion as the heart of trademark infringement. As the Ninth
Circuit noted in Grupo, an absolute territoriality rule without a wellknown mark carve-out could well "promote consumer confusion
and fraud" by enabling businesses within the company to ride on the
coattails of successful foreign businesses.117 Taking Belmora to its
logical end thus suggests that any trademark applicant could register
a mark in a foreign trademark office and subsequently prevent the
registration of similar marks in the U.S. without ever resorting to the
Trademark Office.

115

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
See Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law's Theory of Harm,
95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 117 (2009) ("At a more conceptual level, this literature
suggests that if producer interests are to continue to influence the scope of
trademark protection, courts must confront squarely market preemption and
free-riding arguments, since those arguments have much more empirical
support than the reputational feedback arguments.").
117
Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir.
2004).
116
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C. Pre-Belmora Use of Unfair Competition Precedents
Courts have long applied elements of both trademark and unfair
competition law in establishing the well-known mark doctrine.118
This unstable compromise is becoming increasingly untenable as the
U.S. trademark regime interacts with the demands of an
international market. Unfair competition law has only come to
encompass additional claims over time; it is impractical, if not
impossible, to interpret a doctrine which depends on a specific
national regime according to the international precepts of its
ancestral field of law. Where unfair competition law conflicts with
a foundational trademark principle such as territoriality, trademark
principles should triumph.
Reconciling the disparate parts of the well-known mark doctrine
has become particularly urgent after Belmora. Past courts looked to
the precedents put forward by the Second and Ninth Circuits, and
made their selections based at least in part on whether they
acknowledged Article 6bis as having been incorporated by way of §
44(b) of the Lanham Act, or whether they foresaw a need for
congressional intervention.119 By introducing a new alternative, the
Belmora court showcased an increasing judicial consciousness of
the global environment. But this consciousness must be reined in
with a uniform application of the doctrine.
1. The Complexities of Overlapping Unfair Competition Claims
with Trademark Infringement Claims
The fields of unfair competition and trademark infringement
have historically shared driving precepts, and so methods of
application. Like trademark infringement, unfair competition law
turned on the principle of passing off,120 which "afford[ed] relief
wherever, by reason of an unjustifiable act, the goods of one party
to the suit [would] probably be accepted by the purchasing public as

118

See supra Part I.C.
See Well-Known Mark Doctrine, supra note 43
120
1 L. ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS &
MONOPOLIES (4th ed.) § 2.2.
119
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the goods of another."121 As trade took on an international
perspective, courts came to cite unfair competition as "the umbrella
for all statutory and non-statutory causes of action arising out of
business conduct that is contrary to honest practice in industrial and
commercial matters."122 Such an umbrella includes cases such as
"misappropriation of the right of publicity and other business values,
false advertising and other false representations, and
misappropriation of trade secrets."123 Since inception, these suits
have historically sought to prevent the wrongful diversion of a
plaintiff's business.124
Thus, unfair competition law does more than yield a background
to trademark infringement law. The field continues to absorb many
of trademark infringement's tenets.125 Both trademark and unfair
competition law exist to protect the reputation and goodwill of a
mark as much as it does consumers from deception and confusion
over the source of goods and services.126 Both trademark
121

Wm. A. Rogers, Limited, v. Majestic Products Corporation, 23 F.2d 219,
220 (D. Del. 1927); but see also 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (2d ed.) § 25:1) ("… "palming off"
and "passing off" are synonymous, and are used in judicial opinions to mean
three different things: (1) substitution of one brand of goods when another
brand is ordered; (2) . . . the infringer intentionally meant to defraud and
confuse buyers; and (3) . . . there is no proof of fraudulent intent, but there is
a likelihood of confusion of buyers.")
122
See, e.g., American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494
F.2d 3, 14, (5th Cir. 1974).
123
CALLMANN, supra note 120.
124
See Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 322 (1871)
("… in all cases where rights to the exclusive use of a trade-mark are
invaded, it is invariably held that the essence of the wrong consists in the sale
of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor as those of another, and that it is
only when this false representation is directly or indirectly made that the
party who appeals to the court of equity can have relief.").
125
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4 (1995) ("The
"passing off" held actionable at common law was frequently accomplished
through the use of confusingly similar trade symbols, and during the 19th
century this general principle of liability served as the genesis of the technical
rules governing the validity and infringement of trademarks and the
recognition of secondary meaning.").
126
See 1 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ANTITRUST LAW § 3:12.
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infringement and unfair competition claims thus often depend on
proving likelihood of confusion between marks.127 Even the current
judicial approach to false advertising cases bears striking similarities
to the one taken to cases of trademark infringement.128 As
commentators have noted, "[t]he principles involved in trademark
cases and tradename cases are substantially identical."129
Currently the main distinctions between unfair competition and
trademark infringement lie in the standard of proof.130 Presuming
that courts continue to cross trademark precedents with unfair
competition precedents, however, the Supreme Court's decision in
Lexmark will lower the threshold requirements for proof of standing
substantially in both fields.
D. Consequences and Questions Left Open in Belmora
Even beyond matters of territoriality and broadened unfair
competition precedent, several unresolved questions stand in the
way of owners seeking to claim trademark protection for foreign
marks unused in the U.S. Taken on its face, Belmora tries to deliver
the results of Article 6bis without encroaching on congressional
territory; however, the decision overextends unfair competition law
and so undercuts any precedential use.
Belmora's reliance on unfair competition precedents to decide a
trademark matter pled under the Lanham Act treads on thin ice. Nine
circuits have addressed whether § 44 of the Lanham Act creates a
127

See generally Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 39 S. Ct.
68, 63 L. Ed. 211 (1918).
128
See Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal
Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1312
(2011) ("The advertising plaintiff need not show that the defendant
promulgated the false ad deliberately. Similarly, like the trademark plaintiff,
the advertising plaintiff need not show any actual harm flowing from the
advertisement, unless seeking money damages. To obtain an injunction, the
plaintiff must demonstrate only that the defendant's ad is false and that the
plaintiff is "likely" to be injured by the defendant's conduct. ").
129
Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law's Theory of Harm,
95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 72 (2009).
130
See generally David L. Belt, The Standard for Determining "Unfair Acts
or Practices" Under State Unfair Trade Practices Acts, 80 CONN. B.J. 247
(2006); see also CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO TRADEMARK LAW § 17:11.
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new federal right against unfair competition for foreign competitors.
Of these, only the Ninth Circuit has held that the section grants broad
national protection.131 The remaining courts have, for the most part,
elected to follow the Second Circuit's holding that §§ 44(b), (h), and
(i) only extend to citizens and residents the same benefits that any
convention or treaty recognizes for aliens.132 To date, the Paris
Convention remains the only treaty signed by the U.S. which has
addressed the matter. Unfair competition law, in essence, provides
no answers that trademark law does not: both must go through the
Paris Convention or not at all.
Critics have also flagged concerns on the matter of standing
under the well-known mark doctrine going forward.133 Belmora
aside, only one case has reached a circuit court after Lexmark. In
Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co.,134 the Federal
Circuit held that Cuban cigar company Cubatabaco had a right to
seek the cancellation of a trademark registered in the U.S. even
though Cubatabaco remained barred from selling products within
the country. Looking to statutes which authorized transactions for
registering and renewing trademarks,135 the court determined that
Cubatabaco had a "real interest in cancelling the Registrations and a
reasonable belief that the Registrations blocking its application
[were] causing it damage."136 The decision's restraint struck a sharp
contrast to Belmora, which relied on a lack of explicit statutory
restrictions in order to expand Lexmark's application to cancellation
and other Lanham Act remedies.137 Even presuming that courts can
safely generalize unfair competition tenets into trademark cases,
such decisions must be narrowly read in light of the narrow

131

See Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1950).
See 1 L. ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS &
MONOPOLIES § 2:6 (4th ed.).
133
See generally Charles Lee Thomason, After Lexmark Rejects Multifactor
Measures for Standing, Which Challengers Stand in the Zone of Interests for
Lanham Act Remedies?, 25 FED. CIRC. BAR. J. 699 (2016).
134
Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
135
31 C.F.R. § 515.527.
136
Id. at 1274.
137
See supra Part II.
132
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conditions under which those protections originated.138
Commentators have noted the dangers of taking the well-known
mark doctrine too far.139 By expanding standing to the wide range
of remedies available under unfair competition law and the Lanham
Act, and lowering the necessary burden of proof, Belmora and
Lexmark in combination threaten to impact trademark registration
in the U.S. and chill healthy competition significantly.
III.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HOW TO APPLY THE WELL-KNOWN
DOCTRINE IN A POST-BELMORA WORLD

As trade globalizes, so must trade-related lawsuits. Decades of
commentary have criticized the overlap between unfair competition
and trademark law,140 the conflicts of the well-known mark doctrine
with essential U.S. trademark principles,141 and the complexities of
broadened standing for trademark cases.142 By introducing a new
loophole into the U.S.'s recognition of the Paris Convention,
Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG brings all of these
concerns to a crisis. In a post-Belmora world, courts can no longer
ignore the tensions between the U.S.'s expanding application of
unfair competition precedent and existing trademark canon.
Two answers to this dilemma exist: first, whether a majority of
circuits eventually elect to follow or to reject Belmora's treatment of
foreign trademark owners, courts must rein in the capacity to file
See 1 L. ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS &
MONOPOLIES § 2:6 (4th Ed.) ("…if a liberal interpretation of § 44 were
adopted, Section 1338(b) of the Judicial Code would then appear superfluous,
except . . . in cases of pending claims arising from transactions not affecting
interstate commerce.").
139
See Lee Ann Lockridge, Honoring International Obligations in U.S.
Trademark Law: How the Lanham Act Protects Well-Known Foreign Marks
(and Why the Second Circuit Was Wrong), 84 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1347 (2010).
140
Jamey Minnihan, Having Your Cake and Eating It Too: U.S. Treatment of
Well-Known Foreign Trademarks and Its Global Market Implications, 50
GONZ. L. REV. 219 (2015).
141
Katherine-Anne Pantazis Schroeder, A Trademark Gamble: Should Use of
Services Abroad by U.S. Citizens Meet the Lanham Act "Use in Commerce"
Requirement?, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1615 (2005).
142
Kristin Zobel, The Famous Marks Doctrine: Can and Should Well-Known
Foreign Marks Receive Trademark Protection Within the United States?, 19
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 145 (2008).
138

530

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[VOL. 12:4

claims and cancellation proceedings against U.S.-registered
trademarks based on the priority dates of foreign registrations.
Because the U.S. lacks the binding directives of the E.U. to restrict
the remedies available to unfair competition and trademark
claimants, U.S. courts may look to the Trademark Directive and the
ECJ's decisions for extreme s to avoid in mixing trademark and
unfair competition precedents. Second, legislators should reference
the extensive writings on the well-known mark doctrine in explicitly
delineating the intersection between the Paris Convention and the
Lanham Act. In light of Lexmark, however, any such legislation
should address and prioritize matters of standing for trademark suits.
Only by distinguishing trademark claims can U.S. trademark owners
maintain confidence in their properties.
A. Balancing the Well-Known Mark Doctrine in Court
What problems the judiciary giveth, the judiciary may take
away. Because Belmora's issues arose largely as a matter of
statutory interpretation and judicial implementation, the case has
potential for a quicker solution than awaiting statutory amendments
from Congress. Courts which choose to ignore Belmora's grant of
partial rights to foreign trademark owners will likely follow the
Second Circuit's wholesale rejection of Article 6bis, which provides
the same effects as Belmora and shares its lack of explicit judicial
grounding. While ignoring the systemic faults brought to the fore in
Belmora hardly solves them, avoidance would minimize the
decision's key issue: undermining the territoriality principle by
entrenching precedent where foreign trademarks could supplant
U.S. trademark registrations without some showing of harm within
the country.
In the same vein, courts which accept Belmora must narrow its
scope.
Commentators
have offered myriad potential
implementations for balancing the well-known mark doctrine
against trademark territoriality in the U.S.143 In a post-Belmora
143

See generally James E. Darnton, The Coming of Age of the Global
Trademark: The Effect of Trips on the Well-Known Marks Exception to the
Principle of Territoriality, 20 MICH. ST. INT'L. L. REV. 11 (2011); Geri L.
Haight & Philip Catanzano, The Effects of Global Priority of Trademark
Rights, 91 MASS. L. REV. 18 (2007); Maxim Grinberg, The WIPO Joint
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world, courts seeking to address these matters should pay particular
attention to clarifying the boundaries of what may constitute a 'wellknown mark' and by pleading that its mark enjoys some reputation
in a substantial portion of the relevant market sector, which is likely
to be damaged by the registered mark's uninterrupted use. This
would conform with both common law trademark enforcement and
trademark dilution suits under the Lanham Act, which grants
standing to any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to
be damaged by such act. To this end, courts could look to the 'Joint
Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of WellKnown Marks',144 as the E.U. has done, in entrenching a uniform
definition of the 'well-known mark' distinct from trademark
dilution's 'famous mark' in the U.S. Regardless, courts should
distinguish trademark infringement claims from unfair competition
by restricting unfair competition claims to § 43 of the Lanham Act
and requiring showings of actual territorial harm under trademark
infringement. By restricting remedies to their separate fields, courts
would avoid chilling corporate competition.
1. Learning from how Other Jurisdictions have Applied Article
6bis
The E.U. has avoided quagmires like Belmora by establishing
both resources for defining a 'well-known mark'145 and maintaining
rigorous standards for proving trademark infringement of a foreign
mark.146 Unregistered marks generally receive only the damages and
injunctions necessary to make the plaintiff whole again.147 Under
Recommendation Protecting Well-Known Marks and the Forgotten Goodwill,
5 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2005).
144
World Intellectual Property Organization, Joint Recommendation
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well–Known Marks (Sept. 1999),
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/marks/833/pub833.pdf/.
145
While no general legislative definition exists for the 'well-known
trademark’, trademark offices in signatory countries generally look to the
WIPO recommendation, which has stabilized trademark protection across
countries. See also E.U. Directive 2015/2436/EC, Art. 5(2)(d).
146
E.U. Community Trademark Regulation (207/2009), Art. 8(2)(c).
147
Jane C. Ginsburg, Euro-Yearnings? Moving Toward A "Substantive"
Registration-Based Trademark Regime, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 95, 103 (2017).

532

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[VOL. 12:4

the E.U.'s trademark regime, an inherently distinctive mark need not
show use prior to registration; if a mark lacks that inherent
distinction, the applicant must show that the mark has acquired
distinctiveness through actual use for five years prior to
registration.148 In effect, the E.U. substitutes the remedies available
for intent-to-use applications in the U.S. with a combination of tort
law and broad protections restricted to strong and successful marks.
Its success derives from its presumption that any qualifying mark
deserves broad protection.
By contrast, U.S. trademark law qualifies protection based on
mark use as well as registration. The Trademark Office grants bases
for registration with a show of intent-to-use,149 and courts have
recognized that common law trademark users deserve partial rights
like those obtainable by registration.150 Commentators have
criticized the disparity between types of enforceable rights, noting
that it "undermines the utility of registration even as it honors the
role of consumer perception in giving rise to trademark rights."151
This disparity has another consequence: the U.S. notably lacks the
ECJ's confinement to tort remedies, and standing in trademark cases
does not depend on a showing that the mark has reached a
'substantial portion of the relevant market sector'. Commentators
have noted the U.S.'s increasing trend towards ECJ precedents in its
battle against trademark dilution.152 Intended or not, attempts to
148

European Union Intellectual Prop. Office, Guidelines for Examination of
European Union Trademarks, Part B § 4, § 2.6.5 (2016) (Applicant must prove
"a link between the sign and the goods and services for which the sign is
applied for, establishing that the relevant class of persons, or at least a
significant proportion thereof, identify goods as originating from a particular
undertaking because of the trade mark.").
149
The United States Patent and Trademark Office, Intent-to-Use (ITU)
Applications (last visited on May 23, 2017), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-application-process/filing-online/intentuse-itu-applications/.
150
See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); New
England Duplicating Co. v. Mendes, 190 F.2d 415 (1st Cir. 1951); Electro
Source, LLC v. Brandess-Kalt-Aetna Grp., Inc., 458 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2006).
151
Jane C. Ginsburg, Euro-Yearnings? Moving Toward a "Substantive"
Registration-Based Trademark Regime, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 95, 98 (2017).
152
See Marcus Luepke, Taking Unfair Advantage or Diluting A Famous Mark
- A 20/20 Perspective on the Blurred Differences Between U.S. and E.U.
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follow the E.U.'s mix of unfair competition and trademark law in
implementing the well-known mark doctrine could extend
trademark cancellation rights to marks whose owners have no valid
interests within the U.S.
B. Reforming the Lanham Act: Issues and Strategies
For decades, academics have suggested a number of strategies
for adapting the U.S.'s existing trademark law to the well-known
mark doctrine. In large part, these suggestions remain current:
Congress could amend § 43(a) of the Lanham Act,153 tie trademark
rights into three separate categories of territoriality,154 or structure
the doctrine as a safety valve—as opposed to primary protection—
for foreign trademarks well-known in foreign jurisdictions which
lack registration and use in the U.S.155 Few commentators, however,
address the dangers posed by the growing blur between unfair
competition and trademark precedent, and the threat posed by
allowing owners outside the U.S. market to petition for trademark
cancellations based on unfair competition claims.
In light of the U.S.'s increasing globalization, any reform should
bear in mind two considerations. First, a foreign mark owner
claiming trademark infringement under the well-known mark
doctrine should be required to plead that a substantial percentage of
the relevant market sector is familiar with their mark, and must
provide proof during trial in order to prevail. Second, where the U.S.
recognizes and protects well-known trademarks based on reputation
alone, Congress should confine those protections only to the
relevant market sector and to the geographic areas in which the mark
was provably used. This is in keeping with both common law
trademark principles and with previous academic suggestions to
Dilution Law, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 789 (2008) and Daniel R. Bereskin, AntiDilution/anti-Free-Riding Laws in the United States, Canada, and the E.U.:
Bridges Too Far?, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1710 (2011).
153
Anne Gilson LaLonde, Don't I Know You from Somewhere? Protection in
the United States of Foreign Trademarks That Are Well Known but Not Used
There, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1379, 1423 (2008).
154
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark
Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885 (2004).
155
Leah Chan Grinvald, A Tale of Two Theories of Well-Known Marks, 13
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1 (2010).
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maintain the doctrine as a safety valve. Unlike the E.U., the U.S.
does not have an onerous trademark registration regime; registration
is a small cost to pay for half a continent's worth of protection. Most
significantly, stringent limits would protect the territoriality
principle which defines trademark law.
CONCLUSION
Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG created a
significant loophole for foreign trademark owners to bypass the
U.S.'s existing trademark system and its current registrants. Both the
decision, and its underlying reliance on overextended precedents,
undermined the territoriality principle at the heart of U.S. trademark
law. Future courts have every reason to restrain the decision's
consequences by confining unfair competition to § 43 of the Lanham
Act. Until Congress issues some definitive statement on the Paris
Convention's effect, courts and agencies alike should defer to
territoriality. In particular, owners of well-known trademarks
seeking to enforce a registered trademark owner's traditional rights
based on reputation alone must show both damages and a higher
standard of proof with regard to market share and mark recognition.
International business is increasing, and with it the need for
stronger trademark protections. As the Trademark Office moves
towards a registration regime less protective of marks not in use,156
Belmora serves as a useful bellwether by which to avoid larger
conflicts with the fundamentals of U.S. trademark canon.

156

See, e.g., 82 F.R. 22517.
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PRACTICE POINTERS
● Until the courts reach a consensus, foreign trademark owners
with significant business interests in the U.S. should not rely
on the well-known mark doctrine, but should instead file for
a U.S. trademark.
● Trademark owners seeking to enforce a registration based
outside the U.S. should distinguish between the well-known
mark and the famous mark doctrines in pleadings.
● Attorneys should minimize the integration of unfair
competition case law into trademark infringement suits, and
vice versa, except where strictly relevant to the case at hand.

